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INTRODUCTION 
 
Few if any will question today that WTO agreements set out legally binding rules part of 
public international law (PIL).  The WTO is not some economic bargain between 
governmental trade elites without normative value.  It is a legally binding treaty squarely 
within the wider corpus of international law.  As compared to the original GATT, the 
WTO has, indeed, been “legalized” and, like the proverbial lost son, been re-introduced 
into the broader family of PIL.  During this process the system had a lot to learn from 
PIL. Moreover, important questions as to the WTO’s place in PIL remain to be answered.   
 
Yet, on many levels, the ‘lost son’ is fast outclassing his established family.  As much as 
the WTO can learn from PIL, PIL can also learn from the WTO.  This cross-fertilization 
is perhaps best illustrated in the area of remedies.   
 
While it is clear by now that WTO rules are binding as international law, the next 
question that arises is:  what happens, or ought to happen, in case this law is breached or 
violated?  Put differently, we must distinguish the legally binding nature of WTO rules, 
from the consequences entailed by breaching those rules.  Indeed, whilst PIL is quite 
content to have an abstract rule imposing cessation of all breaches and the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) felt satisfied stating that its rulings must be 
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implemented (with little or no follow-up) the WTO, with its unique dispute settlement 
system and detailed implementation procedures, can and must afford the luxury of asking 
how far and strictly compliance ought to be pushed for.   
  
This transforms the WTO, probably the most legalized treaty regime out there, into a 
laboratory for further sophistication of international law.  In this respect, it is the WTO 
that can impact PIL and push it to the next level of sophistication and development rather 
than the other way around. 
 
One’s view on the remedies that international law ought to provide – e.g., must its rules 
always be complied with or should there be room for bilateral settlement, re-negotiation 
or even unilateral breaches as long as compensation is paid for – is ultimately determined 
by how one perceives international law more generally:  what is its normative value and 
role and what goals can it achieve.   
 
This is how the rather technical question of WTO remedies eventually leads one to 
fundamental questions about international law and, in my view, the widening gap in this 
respect between the two sides of the Atlantic.   
 
Though grossly generalized and probably overstated for dramatic effect, my claim is that 
the American approach to international law is radically different from that of Europe and 
that this difference, in turn, affects how one evaluates WTO remedies.  I elaborate this 
claim in Section I.  
 
Section II sets out how remedies and more broadly the goals of the judicial function are 
perceived and pursued in PIL, the original GATT and now the WTO.  It tries to explain 
why these differences are present and draws lessons from them.  My core claim in 
Section II is that the WTO system is in flux (from a ‘liability rule’ to a ‘property rule’ 
regime) and that, as a result, confusion reigns as to the goals of WTO dispute settlement, 
including the function and impact of its core remedy, suspension of concessions.   
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Section III offers some of the highlights of WTO case law on suspension of concessions.  
It does so to illustrate the ongoing disarray in the field of WTO remedies.  Based on this 
case law, my claim is that (though softened in the last two cases) in the first 10 years of 
the WTO the normative aspirations and rule-oriented approach of the WTO have been 
overdone.  Given the instruments available (essentially “equivalent suspensions”), the 
benchmark objective of the DSU has been set too high. 
 
Finally, Section IV offers suggestions for a way forward.  In summary version, it tries to 
answer the following questions: why should WTO rules not always be complied with; or, 
in contrast, why should we not permit or even stimulate so-called efficient breaches; 
should the level of suspensions be increased or rather lowered; what are the prospects for 
compensation and how should economic and other differences between countries be 
addressed? 
  
I. CONTRASTING VIEWS:  EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WTO REMEDIES 
 
Europe and the United States have fundamentally different views on international law, 
what it is and what it can achieve.  Whilst European countries are locking themselves into 
a new EU Constitution, Presidential candidates in the United States gain their biggest 
applause when pledging not to be constrained by the UN or any other “global test”.1   
 
International legal scholarship is equally divided across the Atlantic.  With limited 
exceptions, European legal scholars approach and analyze international law largely the 
way they analyze domestic law.  They take its independent normative value and 
constraints for granted and often make abstraction of politics and power.  In Europe, the 
need for cooperation and international governance is a given, the question is only how 
best to legitimize it.  In this exercise many Europeans see the need to “constitutionalize” 
                                                 
1 For a representative sample, see Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New 
World Order (2003) and Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream, How Europe’s Vision of the Future is 
Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (2004).  
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international law in pursuit of the Kantian ideal of cosmopolitan law separated from 
politics as far as possible.   
 
In the United States, in contrast, the academic picture is quite different.  With limited 
exceptions, the debate of whether international law is really law remains as hot as ever.  
Most regard international law as merely a pattern of behavior that is driven by self-
interested, rational actors and reflected in law, not constrained by law.  For many 
American scholars, international law can, at best, be explained as a patchwork of 
contract-type, cost-benefit analyses aimed at enhancing economic welfare or political 
support at home.  In this exercise, international cooperation, if feasible and needed in the 
first place, must be legitimized by national sovereignty, preferably through the interface 
of domestic, democratic politics. 
 
Of all WTO affairs, this divide between the European normative approach and the 
American transactional approach to international law is felt most acutely in the discussion 
over WTO remedies.   
 
Not surprisingly, the EC (as well as most other WTO members, in particular developing 
countries) have strongly defended the WTO as a legally binding regime and taken the 
view that compliance with WTO rules has a self-standing normative value and is, 
therefore, required.  The United States, in contrast, though a strong supporter of a rules-
based system in the sense that redress must be sought, and can automatically be obtained, 
through the multilateral dispute settlement system, frequently portrays the WTO as a 
balance of trade concessions, backed-up by the threat of reciprocal withdrawals of 
concessions.  In this spirit, the United States seems to accept the possibility to settle, re-
negotiate, compensate or suffer suspensions as an alternative, though not preferred, 
solution to trade disputes.   
 
In a similar vein, in WTO arbitrations where the right and level of trade suspensions was 
set, the EC has consistently argued that the objective of suspensions is to induce 
compliance with WTO rules, not to compensate or re-balance the scales of trade 
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concessions.  Discounting the cases where it was the target of retaliation, the EC has also 
been the strongest supporter of broad retaliation rights and an expansive view on the level 
of suspensions permitted (see FSC, 1916 and Byrd arbitrations).  Confirming its general 
stance in favor of further legalization and tougher remedies for non-compliance, in the 
ongoing review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the EC introduced 
proposals to strengthen WTO remedies, in particular, the remedy of compensation, be it 
trade or monetary compensation.   
 
The United States, in contrast, though ready to accept that inducing compliance is 
possibly one of the objectives of WTO suspensions, has taken the view that “retaliation” 
also serves other objectives, in particular compensation or re-balancing of the scales of 
trade concessions (see Byrd arbitration).  In addition, convinced that retaliation ought to 
be strictly limited to harm caused in the bilateral trade relations between the disputing 
parties, the United States has balked at arbitration reports that broadly defined the right or 
level of suspensions.2  This aversion for stricter WTO remedies came to light also in the 
DSU review process where none of the US proposals had to do with remedies and the 
United States did not make a single comment in the long winded discussions, triggered 
by countries such as Mexico and the African Group, on how to strengthen WTO 
remedies.  It is hard not to read this diplomatic silence as a rejection of such proposals.  
Quite tellingly, when a panel found that Australia was obliged to reclaim export subsidies 
that it had granted to one of its leather producers in the past, thereby awarding the United 
States a uniquely strong retrospective remedy, the United States reaction at the DSB was 
one of disappointment:   
 
The Panel's remedy went beyond that sought by the United States.  Nevertheless, 
because this case had gone on for far too long … the United States believed that it 
was time to bring this dispute to a close by adopting the Panel Report.3
 
                                                 
2 In particular, the FSC report where the EC was authorized to suspend up to the full amount of US export 
subsidies including those for exports going to third countries and the Export Credits report where the 
arbitrators rather dryly added 20% to the amount of suspensions Brazil could take in response to the 
admission by Canada that it would not withdraw the subsidy for contracted, but non-delivered aircraft. 
3 WT/DSB/M75, p. 5. 
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In the legal academy, this EU-US contrast -- more versus less legalization, stricter versus 
weaker retaliation rights – is arguably even more outspoken.  With the exception of John 
Jackson and Gary Horlick, most American commentators stress the re-negotiation or 
rebalancing the scales nature of WTO dispute settlement, warning against too much 
legalization or tougher retaliation that would prevent so-called efficient breaches of WTO 
rules.4  In this class of no-need-for-stronger-remedies advocates, one could also add 
commentators who have argued for a less coercive and more managerial approach to 
WTO compliance.5   
 
In contrast, most European legal scholars -- in unison with developing country 
governments and commentators6 -- have raised serious doubts as to the equity and 
efficiency of current WTO remedies. They point out that developing countries, given 
their relatively weak economies and strong dependency on investment and consumer 
imports, are severely disadvantaged in a system based on economic “sanctions”.7  They 
stress the need to go beyond equivalent suspensions or to add compensation or reparation 
if the DSU is to truly induce compliance with WTO rules in the interest of private 
economic operators.8  To limit governmental discretion and ensure rule-predictability for 
private traders, a number of European scholars advocate giving direct effect to WTO 
rules before domestic European courts.9
 
As I try to illustrate below both the European normative approach and the American 
transactional approach to international law have their advantages.  However, both, 
especially when driven to the extreme, also present serious flaws:  in summary, the 
normative approach for trying to be “more catholic than the pope”, failing to make 
distinctions between types of rules and disregarding concerns of economic efficiency, 
                                                 
4 See Judith Bello, Alan Sykes & Warren Schwartz, David Palmeter, Downs & Rocke, Robert Lawrence. 
5 Such as Steve Charnovitz, calling for the WTO’s teeth to be pulled, or Chi Charmody, as well as a 
number of non-American economists writing on WTO retaliation (see Hauser & Roitinger), which should 
come as no surprise since the “rebalancing” view of the US legal academy is engrained in notions of law 
and economics. 
6 Such as Edwini Kessie, Victor Mosoti and Rafiqul Islam. 
7 Horn & Mavroidis, Mary Footer, Naboth van den Broek. 
8 Mavroidis, Marco Bronckers, Andreas Ziegler, Bernard O’Connor. 
9 Cottier, Petersmann. 
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political reality and domestic politics; the transactional approach, in turn, for its denial of 
international law as true law and its failure to transcend the domestic interest and accept 
international law as a constraining factor to the benefit of all countries, not just the most 
powerful ones, and at the service not just of unitary states or governments but private 
individuals and economic actors behind the state veil. 
  
II. THE GOALS AND INSTRUMENTS OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, GATT AND THE WTO 
 
The judicial branch of most legal systems has a combination of, at least, the following 
functions or goals:   
 
(1) Settlement: exchange information/arguments and provide incentives for parties to 
come to a mutually agreed settlement; 
(2) Rebalancing:  if one party violates, another should not be obliged to continue to 
perform its obligation v-a-v the wrongdoer; this results from an idea of fairness or 
reciprocity; 
(3) Compensation:  repair damage caused by the breach to victims of the beach 
(4) Compliance:  bring about conformity with the rules 
(5) Clarification:  clarify the rules to facilitate compliance or settlement in the 
specific case, as well as to guide future conduct 
(6) Deterrence/Punishment:  deter future violations of the law 
 
The way these functions are pursued in public international law, the original GATT and 
now the WTO is summarized in Table 1.  Only the legal instruments available to fulfill 
any or all of these goals are listed.  Crucially, especially for the GATT/WTO regimes, the 
following elements that may induce compliance and/or affect deterrence, should be 
added: 
 
• Reputation costs (in particular the risk that future commitments lose credibility) 
• A desire to maintain the stability and legitimacy of the institution itself 
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• Independent belief in the ideas/benefits behind the rules 
• Domestic costs linked to breach (such as higher consumers prices and losses for 
importers or limits imposed by national law) 
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TABLE 1:  DISPUTE SETTLEMENT FUNCTIONS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, GATT 1947 AND THE WTO 
 
 Settlement Rebalancing Compensation Compliance Clarification Deterrence 
 
PIL * Treaty can 
be re-
negotiated
Arts. 39-41 
VC 
* Victim can 
consent to 
breach 
Art. 20 ASR  
* Victim can 
waive rights 
Art. 45 
Unilateral 
Suspension of 
treaty in 
response to 
material 
breach 
Art. 60 VC 
(Exceptio 
inadimpleti 
contractus) 
 
Obligation to 
make full 
reparation for 
the injury 
caused by the 
breach 
Art. 31 ASR 
*Obligation to 
cease the breach 
Art. 30 ASR 
 
*Unilateral 
Countermeasures 
to induce 
compliance 
Art. 49 ASR 
No 
compulsory 
dispute 
settlement 
mechanism 
*Treaty 
suspension “in 
whole or in part” 
 
*Full reparation 
 
*Unilateral 
Countermeasures 
must be 
proportional  
(not punitive) 
Art. 51 ASR 
GATT * First 
objective is 
“satisfactory 
adjustment” 
Art. XXIII:2 
But:  Not 
harm 1/3 
parties 
(MFN) 
* Can re-
negotiate 
tariff  
Art. XXVIII 
* Can obtain 
waiver  
Authorized 
Suspension if 
circumstances 
are serious 
enough 
Art. XXIII:2  
* No 
reparation 
 
*Suspension 
offers some 
compensation 
(but only 
restores 
situation ex 
ante; does not 
offer benefits 
of 
performance)  
*No explicit 
obligation of 
cessation 
 
*No 
countermeasures 
on top of 
suspension 
Specific 
dispute 
settlement 
mechanism 
but can be 
blocked 
Suspension 
“appropriate in 
the 
circumstances” 
(but not 
punitive) 
WTO  
Idem GATT 
 
DSU Art. 
3.7:  
Settlement is 
“clearly 
preferred” 
 
*Voluntary 
compensation 
to offset 
continued 
breach 
 
*If no 
compensation: 
Automatic 
suspension in 
all cases 
 
Idem GATT 
*Implied 
obligation of 
cessation
 
*No 
countermeasures 
on top of 
suspension 
 
Automatic 
dispute 
settlement 
Suspension 
“equivalent” to 
nullification (not 
punitive) 
 
VC:  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
ASR:  Articles on State Responsibility of the International Law Commission 
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A number of points can be drawn from Table 1: 
 
• Compliance with the rules at all cost is not the objective of any of the three 
systems:  even if there is an obligation to cease the breach (as in PIL and 
implicitly in the WTO), the breach can also be stopped by dis-applying or 
changing the rule in the first place (through re-negotiation, bilateral settlement 
or waiver)10; such ‘settlement’ in the broad sense may not, however, affect the 
rights of third parties (in the GATT/WTO in particular their MFN rights) nor alter 
rules of jus cogens (such as the prohibition on genocide or slavery).   
 
The direction in DSU Art. 3.5 that all solutions to matters formally raised under 
the DSU “shall be consistent with [WTO] agreements” is there to protect third 
parties.  It does not prevent the two disputing parties from changing, adapting or 
dis-applying a particular rule as it applies to the dispute at hand for as long as 
third party rights remain unaffected.  Under the VC (Article 30), such settlement 
prevails over the WTO rule as the norm later in time; under the ASR, the 
settlement amounts to consent precluding wrongfulness (under Art. 20) or, at the 
least, a waiver of dispute settlement rights (under Art. 45). 
 
The fact that rules (other than those of jus cogens) are, therefore, not written in 
stone and can be changed by agreement should not come as a surprise nor should 
it reflect badly on international law.  In domestic law as well, parties are at liberty 
to re-negotiate their contracts (only in special areas such as criminal law are 
wrongdoer and victim precluded from settlement).  Unlike human rights or 
international criminal law where compliance with the original rule leaves little 
scope for manoeuvring, trade law is riddled with exceptions, differential 
                                                 
10 WTO examples of such “settlements” in deviation from the original rule, though without affecting third 
party rights, can be seen in procedural agreements on how to pursue DSU implementation provisions and 
sequencing (in deviation of Art. 22 of the DSU but routinely enforced by WTO panels); almost all bilateral 
settlements ending a dispute (where some delay in compliance or minor deviations from the rules are 
tolerated, albeit at time conditioned on the payment of compensation elsewhere; or, such as in the Helms-
Burton case where the measure remained intact but was simply dis-applied in a number of cases and the EC 
was convinced not to push the case further if only to avoid the breakdown of the DSU); and the waiver 
granted for the EC’s banana regime (since still inconsistent with WTO rules).   
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treatment, deviations and possibilities for re-negotiation.  Without it the system 
would not have been erected in the first place, nor would it be as effective in 
offering practical solutions to real-world trade problems.  This should temper too 
normative (or too ‘European’) an approach to international and GATT/WTO law. 
  
• Whilst PIL has separate instruments to achieve each of the different goals, 
the GATT/WTO has essentially only one instrument to achieve a variety of 
goals, namely suspension of concessions. 
 
This lack of further legal remedies, in particular reparation, is explained by the 
fact that at its origin GATT was a political bargain struck in a club-like 
atmosphere, not a legal construct based on the rule of law and reparation or 
punishment for ‘illegal’ conduct (what remains actionable today is not so much a 
violation of WTO rules but rather nullification or impairment of benefits, 
irrespective of whether there is breach).   
 
Given the vagueness and incompleteness of much of the GATT contract (future 
events as well as future support for trade liberalization are unclear), countries 
were simply not ready to commit themselves to reparation (nor did they feel much 
need for it given that the GATT bargain was thought of as self-enforcing based on 
the principle of reciprocity).11  Moreover, as one WTO arbitrator noted: “In WTO 
dispute settlement cases, it is probably true that most defending parties argue in 
good faith that they believed the measures at issue were in conformity with the 
relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement”12 (this stands in contrast to realist, or 
law and economics, authors which regard breach as a calculated decision based on 
national gains or cost-benefit calculations).  To give large damages awards in 
such ‘good faith situations’ (knowing, in particular, that most trade disputes are 
                                                 
11 In addition, in many WTO cases, a finding that the measure is inconsistent with the rules at the time of a 
panel ruling does not necessarily mean that it has been inconsistent from the day it was enacted.  Balance of 
payments measures are a prime example.  
12 Canada – Export Credits, para. 399. 
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about laws or regulations that may have been in place for years) may have been 
regarded as too drastic a remedy. 
 
In respect of the remaining remedy of suspension, from the very creation of 
GATT in 1947 confusion existed as to its function.  It was clearly thought of as 
achieving more than passively suspending compliance in return for breach (in the 
Art. 60 VC sense of inadimpleti non est adimplendum).  During GATT 
negotiations the goal of compensation, even that of deterrence and punishment 
were also referred to.  In the drafting history there was, for example, much 
discussion on whether suspension was to be “merely” compensatory or also 
amount to a sanction so as to induce compliance.13   
 
Unlike other treaty suspensions, suspending a trade concession may, indeed, have 
some compensatory elements (beyond a mere technical re-balancing) in that re-
introducing a higher tariff can possibly improve the country’s terms of trade (if 
the country is large enough) and renewed protection can bring along political 
support from domestic industries (even though, like a true countermeasure, such 
as a military strike, trade suspensions can also be costly to the one imposing them, 
in terms of losses to importers and higher consumer prices).  In addition, the 
                                                 
13 Although some delegations wanted to provide for punitive sanctions so as to ensure compliance with the 
rules rather than simply re-balance the scales (ROBERT HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND 
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (2nd edition, 1990) at 31; JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND 
THE LAW OF GATT (1969), at 169, note 21), a Working Group examining the question in the context of 
the Havana Charter recommended that, even in the case of legal violation, the remedy should be 
compensatory suspension of concessions and no more (E/Conf.2/C.6/W.80, Working party report, January 
30, 1948, the proposals were adopted without debate, ibid., W.102, February 16, 1948).  As a result, in the 
final Havana Charter, the provision corresponding to GATT Article XXIII:2 referred to suspensions that 
are “appropriate and compensatory”.  To clear all doubt, an interpretative paragraph stated that “the nature 
of the relief to be granted is compensatory and not punitive” and that the word “appropriate” should not be 
read to provide relief “beyond compensation” (Reports of Committees and Principal Subcommittees, note 
16, p. 155).  These Havana Charter clarifications occurred, however, after the GATT itself was concluded 
and were subsequently not incorporated into the GATT.  Article XXIII of GATT was taken from the earlier 
Geneva draft of the ITO Charter, as Hudec noted, “a stop-action photograph of a provision still very much 
in flux” (Hudec, supra, at 52).  The legal value of those later Havana Charter clarifications is questionable.  
One could say that they confirm the GATT contracting parties’ philosophy of regarding GATT as a balance 
of concessions (compensatory suspensions, not punitive economic sanctions).  One could also argue a 
contrario and focus on the fact that the clarifications were not subsequently incorporated into the GATT.  
In support of the latter position, John Jackson adds that the Havana Charter dealt with a broader range of 
obligations than GATT and that this difference may explain why the ITO mechanism was made softer, i.e., 
compensatory only (Jackson, supra at 169).   
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suspension of trade concessions may also have a more active, coercive effect than 
other (purely technical or passive) treaty suspensions in that closing off export 
markets causes both economic and political harm to the country kept out.   
 
Hence, from day one suspension was set up as a mixed instrument in the hope of 
achieving multiple goals without clearly defining those goals nor tailor-making 
suspension as a instrument to actually achieve those goals.   
 
• Whilst the WTO has set more ambitious goals than the GATT (by adding an 
at least implicit obligation of cessation, i.e., an obligation to conform to DSB 
rulings), the one GATT/WTO instrument to achieve those goals has been 
weakened (from ‘appropriate’ to ‘equivalent’ suspensions14, a level that is weaker 
also than ‘proportional’ countermeasures under PIL15).   
 
Though somewhat of a paradox this move can be explained: (i) WTO members 
agreed to a compulsory and automatic dispute system; this meant that they would 
likely face rulings with which they strongly disagree or that they cannot 
implement (at least not immediately); as a result, as a precondition for their 
                                                 
14 Nothing in GATT Art. XXIII:2, referring to suspensions “as appropriate”, explicitly restricted suspension 
to a level reciprocal or equivalent to the original nullification.  The requirement that the suspension be 
“appropriate” can include equivalence to the original harm caused but depending on the circumstances may 
also go below or above that level.  In support, see a 1988 statement by the GATT Legal Adviser:  After 
noting that suspension under Article XIX (safeguards) and Article XXVIII (tariff renegotiations) was 
limited to “equivalent” concessions, he added:  “In the case of Article XXIII, the wording was wider, 
referring to measures determined to be appropriate in the circumstances, which meant that there was a 
wider leeway in calculating the retaliatory measures under Article XXIII than under Articles XIX or 
XXVIII” (GATT doc. C/M/220, at 36, quoted in WTO, 2 Analytical Index:  Guide to GATT Law and 
Practice 698 (1995); as confirmed by the then Deputy Director-General, GATT doc. C/M/224, at 19, 
quoted in WTO, ANALYTICAL INDEX:  GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE (1995) 699.  Yet, in 
the one case where suspensions under GATT 1947 were authorized, the level of suspension was determined 
“having regard to its equivalence to the impairment suffered by the Netherlands as a result of the United 
States restrictions” (Netherlands Action Under Article XXIII:2 to Suspend Obligations to the United States, 
BISD 1S/62 (l/61), para. 2, see also para. 3).   
15 Suspension equivalent to nullification or impairment in DSU terms is also more limited than 
proportional countermeasures under PIL (Art. 51 ASR) where “[c]ountermeasures must be commensurate 
with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in 
question”.  The gravity of the act and the rights in question can drive countermeasures above the harm 
caused or at least provide flexibility to over-estimate such harm.  For an example see the Case Concerning 
the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (United States of America v. France) (1978) International 
Law Reports, Vol. 54 (1979), p. 304.  
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acceptance of the DSU, remedies had to be kept weak and suspension capped at 
“equivalence”;  
 
(ii) the basic deal underlying the DSU was automatic dispute settlement (so that 
US requests for panels would no longer be blocked) in exchange for stopping US 
unilateralism in the enforcement of trade obligations (Section 301).  In this 
context, for many WTO members (in particular the weaker ones) capping US 
sanctions to “equivalence” was a major objective and achievement;  
 
(iii) it is common place in the evolution of any legal system to start out with a 
regime of unregulated retaliation (i.e., unfettered countermeasures at a multiplier 
of the original harm caused, much like in the pre-PIL world and, for some areas of 
international law, as remains the case today even under PIL); the next step is 
usually formalized retaliation, capped 1:1 with the original breach (such as the lex 
talionis or the Exodus’ “eye for eye, tooth for tooth”).16  This 1:1 move occurs to 
limit the societal costs of crime and punishment and to stabilize relations by 
making reactions and the cost of crime more predictable.   
 
In this sense, the reduction and cap on WTO countermeasures is a step forward 
(though only made possible because dispute settlement, including authorization to 
take countermeasures, became automatic; otherwise the US would never have 
abandoned Section 301; equally, without multilateral control over breach and 
equivalence of suspension, weaker countries would not have agreed to making 
countermeasures automatic).    
 
Notwithstanding these explanations, the fact remains that too much is now 
expected from “suspension of concessions”; it is seen as an instrument to 
rebalance, to compensate, to induce compliance/settlement and to deter future 
violations.  Given the nature of trade sanctions (costly for the one imposing 
                                                 
16 Note, however, that the lex talionis (as implied by its origin in the word talio, equal in kind) sets a 
qualitative equivalence (i.e., your eye for my eye).  The DSU’s equivalence is a purely quantitative one (in 
terms of nullification and impairment caused by the breach and the countermeasure). 
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them), their 1:1 cap (unlikely to make breach more costly than compliance) and 
the purely prospective nature of WTO remedies (the first 2-3 years of any breach 
are “for free”), in most cases, it is simply impossible for suspension alone to meet 
any, let alone all, of those objectives.  Moreover, as economists have long pointed 
out, a single economic instrument cannot achieve more than one distinct 
purpose.17     
 
• The fact that, nonetheless, the compliance record with WTO rules and rulings is 
impressive indicates that it is not so much legal remedies (such as suspensions) 
that induce compliance with WTO rules but rather political/normative 
factors, such as the threat of suspensions, reputation costs, peer pressure, 
example setting (all of which are amplified given that WTO dispute settlement is 
a repeat play), a broader stake in the institution as a whole, shared believes in the 
its rules and domestic pressure to comply (be it because of legal incorporation of 
WTO principles into national law or domestic constituencies pushing for 
compliance). 
   
The influence of these largely non-economic factors (difficult to grasp under US-
style realist or law and economics approaches to international law) is well 
illustrated by WTO suspension practice.  Winning complainants push hard for the 
right to suspend concessions, and spent valuable resources on obtaining as high a 
level as possible in long-winded WTO arbitrations, only to afterwards not actually 
use the authorization to suspend concessions (only 4 out of the current 16 
authorizations have so far been used, one of which (FSC) not even to the full 
amount).18  It shows that the mere right to suspend (preferably as high as possible) 
is seen as a valuable asset in and of itself, even if it is not actually exercised, 
because of the reputation and other institutional/normative effects that are linked 
to it. 
                                                 
17  See J. Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy 39-41 (1963). 
18 The EC, for example, was fighting tooth and nail in the 1916 Act and Byrd Amendment arbitrations trying 
to obtain as high a level as possible, while at the same time it cannot even utilize to the full the suspension 
rights it already has against the US as a result of FSC (instead of the usual 100% duties, in FSC, the EC has 
only added 5% , to be increased monthly by 1%). 
DRAFT 8 October 2004 16
 
• PIL grants a so-called “property right” to right holders, that is, the right 
holder has, at least in theory, a right to compliance with the rules; without his 
approval, compensation or suspension in lieu of compliance is not accepted.  Put 
differently, the obligation of cessation is strictly imposed (and can only be taken 
away by agreement, e.g., through settlement, discussed in point 1 above): the 
wrongdoer cannot “buy his way out”, that is, unilaterally decide to pay 
compensation instead of performing on the ground, for example, that the cost of 
compliance exceeds the cost of compensation.  In this sense, PIL does not permit, 
let alone induce, so-called “efficient breaches”.  PIL is a property rule regime, 
not a liability rule regime.   
 
As a result, and again somewhat paradoxically, the legal regime that probably has 
the hardest time inducing compliance with its rules – i.e., international law, given 
its lack of coercion over states  -- sets for itself the highest benchmark of 
compliance:  cessation or specific performance in every case.  In most domestic 
legal systems a difference is made, however, between, on the one hand, 
obligations requiring specific performance or criminal sanctions even if the victim 
were happy with compensation and, on the other hand, obligations where the 
obligation-holder can unilaterally pay compensation in lieu of performance (as 
under most contracts).  In international law, in contrast, all laws and obligations 
are put on equal footing (with the exception of jus cogens) and all require 
cessation in the event of breach (compensation does not suffice).   
 
The idea that imposing specific performance (say, forcing a person to comply 
with a labor contract and work for a particular company) may go against the 
physical integrity or individual freedom of individuals, has not been transposed to 
the inter-state level.  Nor has the law and economics theory that certain breaches, 
if fully compensated for, may actually be desirable if on the whole they lead to 
more welfare without making anyone worse off (the theory of so-called “efficient 
breach”).  Again, this is somewhat surprising given that each state considers itself 
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to be sovereign (and ought therefore be quite hesitant to commit itself to specific 
performance in each case) and international law is often portrayed as a game of 
rational actors seeking welfare maximization (and might therefore be inclined to 
engage in efficient breaches). 
 
One explanation for this attempt by international law to be stricter and more rule-
oriented than domestic law itself -- if you wish, to be “more catholic than the 
pope” -- is that the system fully realizes that cessation and specific performance 
are far from ensured in a system that lacks centralization and coercion and that 
therefore it may be better to at least have the strict obligation of cessation on the 
books, in the hope that it will induce compliance with the most egregious 
breaches (though well aware that it may not stop states to engage in smaller or so-
called efficient breaches).19  
 
This consideration looses, of course, much of its force in the WTO context with 
compulsory and automatic dispute settlement.  It transforms the WTO, probably 
the most legalized treaty regime out there, into a laboratory for further 
sophistication of international law.  As noted earlier, whilst PIL is quite content to 
have an abstract rule imposing cessation and the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice felt satisfied stating that its rulings must be implemented (with little or 
no follow-up) the WTO, with its unique dispute settlement system and detailed 
implementation procedures, can afford the luxury of asking how far and strictly 
compliance ought to be pushed for (see below).   
 
• In contrast, the original GATT was a liability rule regime:  it lacked an 
obligation of cessation and was focused rather on rebalancing; in other words, 
wrongdoers could, without the agreement of the opposing party, “pay their way 
                                                 
19 This thinking was expressed by at least one of the Rapporteurs on State Responsibility preparing the 
ASR.  He observed that cessation assumes greater importance in international, as opposed to domestic, law 
because international law lacks a coercive mechanism.  Where states cannot be compelled to take positive 
measures, they should at least be obliged to observe the bare rule of law.  Cessation therefore stresses “not 
only the interest of the injured State but also the interests of the international community in the preservation 
of, and reliance upon, the rule of law” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1993, Vol. II (Part 
Two), p. 55). 
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out” by offering compensatory trade concessions or suffering a reciprocal 
withdrawal of concessions.  This was reflected not only in GATT Art. XXIII, but 
also (and more explicitly) in escape clauses and re-negotiation provisions such as 
Art. XIX on safeguards and Art. XXVIII on tariff re-negotiations where, in the 
absence of agreement between the parties, a country can unilateral re-impose 
protection for as long as it pays for it by suffering reciprocal withdrawals of 
concessions. 
 
• The move from GATT to WTO is a gradual evolution from a liability rule 
regime to a property rule regime:  the WTO has an implicit obligation of 
cessation: compensation or suspension are only temporary and can no longer 
replace compliance; wrongdoers do not have the unilateral right to “buy their way 
out”.  As one recent arbitrator put it, “we do not read anything in the DSU or in 
the [Subsidies] Agreement which would create a right not to comply with DSB 
recommendations and rulings”.20  In practice, however, they can still do so 
“temporarily” (by paying compensation as in the EC-US Copyright case or by 
suffering suspensions as in the Hormones or FSC disputes).   
 
At the same time, the WTO did maintain aspects of the GATT’s liability rule 
regime, namely the safeguards mechanism, the tariff re-negotiation provision as 
well as other regimes (such as Art. XXIV:6 on customs unions or Art. XII on 
balance of payments measures) where protectionist barriers can be re-erected 
unilaterally for as long as one pays for it, without the agreement of other parties.  
In addition, of course, the WTO also maintained the possibility – now expressed 
even as a “clear preference” -- for settlement, including, “buying your way out” 
with the agreement of the opposing party as long as the rights of third parties 
remain unaffected. 
 
In this context, the ongoing discussion on whether WTO members have a strict 
legal obligation to conform to WTO rulings is somewhat artificial and must be 
                                                 
20 Canada – Export Credits, para. 3.104. 
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transcended.21  I do agree with John Jackson that an obligation to comply can be 
implied from DSU provisions (as importantly:  not a single WTO member, not 
even the US, has ever argued in any WTO dispute nor during any of the DSU 
review sessions, that compensation or suspension can fully replace compliance as 
an equally available option the way proponents of “efficient breach” suggest22).  
At the same time, the DSU does permit temporary compensation or suspension of 
concessions in lieu of compliance.  Since “temporary” is not defined, in practice, 
compliance can therefore be seriously delayed.  As importantly, the WTO has 
maintained, even extended, a number of alternative ways to avoid strict 
compliance with WTO rules, be it (i) the liability rules in Arts. XIX (safeguards), 
XXIV:6 (custom unions), XXVIII (tariff re-negotiations, copied also for GATS 
concessions in GATS Art. XXI), etc. or (ii) through settlement or re-negotiation 
by mutual agreement (point 1 above) or by waiver.  In sum, the WTO is a mixed 
system combining an implicit property rule (in the DSU) with explicit 
liability rules (in specific GATT/GATS provisions). 
 
In sum, while PIL and its insistence on cessation in each and every case reflects the 
European, normative approach to international law, the traditional GATT system, with its 
mercantillistic, reciprocity-driven foundation and political flexibility far removed from 
the strictures of law as we know it domestically, corresponds rather to an American, 
transactional approach to international law.  The current WTO system, in contrast, falls 
somewhere in between the two. 
 
The gradual shift from a (GATT) “liability rule” regime to a (WTO) “property rule” 
regime has left the WTO’s judicial branch confused as to the goals of WTO dispute 
settlement.  In particular, the case law on suspension of concessions is in disarray (see 
Section III below).  The inclusion of an implicit “property rule” in the DSU (a legal 
obligation to conform to WTO rulings), combined with the more general rule-orientation 
of the new WTO (away from blocking panel reports and a la carte agreements), created 
                                                 
21 See for the latest on this issue: John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement 
Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AJIL (January 2004). 
22 See Sykes & Schwartz, Lawrence etc. 
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extremely high normative expectations.  Those expectations were only fuelled by the 
WTO’s gradual re-instatement into the broader corpus of public international law (in its 
very first report the Appellate Body stated that the WTO treaty cannot be read “in clinical 
isolation” from public international law).  This re-instatement meant that for the 
interpretation of WTO remedies as well, guidance was sought in the fall-back remedies of 
PIL.  And as noted earlier, for a variety of reasons, those PIL remedies (a “property rule” 
regime) are harsher than those at the WTO.   
 
Considering the early WTO case law, my claim is, therefore, that the normative 
aspirations and rule-oriented approach of the new WTO have been overdone.  The effort 
to legalize the world trade system has in a way been too successful or created too high an 
expectation.  Countries, panels and commentators have lost sight of the DSU’s “clear 
preference” for settlements and the WTO’s flexibility that, much like PIL, permits re-
negotiation, escape clauses and settlements (point 1 above).  This over-eagerness for 
normative stability (which may please the lawyer’s ear but can in effect hamper the 
practical and efficient resolution of trade problems) is best illustrated in the early case 
law of WTO arbitrators deciding on equivalent levels of suspension.   
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III. HIGHLIGHTS OF WTO CASE LAW ON SUSPENSION OF CONCESSIONS 
 
The WTO’s initial eagerness for what could be seen as over-legalization (too normative 
or ‘European’ an approach) is reflected in the following case law highlights.  These 
highlights demonstrate the disarray and confusion that currently prevails in the field of 
WTO remedies and the related question of the goal(s) of WTO dispute settlement.  In 
particular, the confusion over what suspensions of concessions are, how to define and 
measure them and what they are aimed at, is complete.  
 
In this light, the need for the Appellate Body to step in is acute.  Under current rules 
arbitration reports on suspension cannot be appealed (much to the delight of arbitrators, 
who have often not fully explained their rulings and calculations or made creative legal 
interpretations that other panels would not have made in the shadow of an appeal).  This 
rule ought to be changed and WTO members must be granted a right to challenge the 
legal (not the factual) conclusions of arbitrators.23    The question of WTO remedies and 
the goals of WTO dispute settlement are too important to be left outside of the purview of 
the WTO’s highest judicial organ. 
 
                                                 
23 Mexico’s proposal for DSU review makes Art. 22.6 arbitrations subject to appeal.  In the alternative, the 
Appellate Body could pronounce its views in complaints brought against suspensions under normal DSU 
proceedings (as it did in US – Certain Products, but only as regards the timing of suspensions) or in 
implementation procedures under DSU Art. 21.5 (where appeal is now accepted, though nowhere explicitly 
confirmed in the DSU itself). 
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TABLE 2: WTO SUSPENSIONS 1995-2004 
 Amount 
requested 
Opposing 
party’s 
estimate 
Suspensions 
authorized 
Actual 
suspensions 
US in Bananas $520 m 0 $191.4 m April 1999- 
July 2001 
US in 
Hormones 
$202 m $53,301,675 $116.8 m July 1999 –  
… 
Canada in 
Hormones 
CAN$75 m CAN$ 
3,537,769 
CAN$ 11.3 m August 1999 - … 
Ecuador in 
Bananas 
$450 m  $201.6 m Not imposed 
Canada in 
Aircraft 
CAN$700 m  CAN$344.2m Not imposed 
EC in FSC $4.043 billion $1.110 
billion 
$4.043 billion Additional duty of 
5% as of March 
2004 (monthly 
increase by 1% 
until 17%)  
Brazil in 
Aircraft 
$3.36 billion  $247,797,000  Not imposed 
EC in 1916 Act Mirror 
legislation 
0 Amounts of 
final judgments 
and disclosed 
settlements 
against EC  
No nullification so 
far 
Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, 
EC, India, 
Japan, Korea, 
Mexico in 
Byrd 
Offset 
disbursements 
related to 
country’s own 
exports plus 
share of 
balance (except 
for Chile) 
Limit 
suspension 
to disburs-
ments on 
own exports 
72% of total 
disbursements 
related to 
country’s own 
exports only 
For 2003: 
Brazil: $ 1 m 
Canada: $ 3.1m 
Chile: $576,000 
EC: $ 18 
India: $ 1.44 m 
Japan: $ 76 
Korea: $ 9 
Mexico: $ 2.9 
Total: $112 m
Not (yet) imposed 
* Total number of 16 authorizations in 7 different disputes (2 against EC; 3 against US; 
one dispute pending:  US-Japan Apples, US request for $143.4 m) 
* Total amount of 1.144 billion plus 4.043 billion in FSC = $ 5.187 billion
* Also $ 1,219,800 paid annually by US to EC in Copyright case 
* Threat of EC sanctions in US Steel case (US safeguard withdrawn in time) 
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(i) Are suspensions of trade concessions mere treaty suspensions rebalancing the scales 
(a la Art. 60 VC), or a compensatory device; or rather must they be seen as 
countermeasures (in line with Art. 49 of the ASR) or even sanctions (as prohibited even 
under PIL)?  
 
• Up to the last two cases (1916 Act and Byrd), arbitrators found unabashedly that 
suspensions are there “to induce compliance”.  They equated WTO suspensions 
with countermeasures under PIL.  As a result, they found support for the 
objective of “inducing compliance” in the ASR and PIL cases on 
countermeasures.  However, driven by a normative/European/property rule 
approach to the WTO, they never really examined whether WTO suspensions can 
genuinely be said to be countermeasures, both in name and in terms of their level 
and function.   
 
• At the same time, arbitrators were faced with the restriction that suspensions 
could not go beyond a level “equivalent” to the nullification caused by the 
original breach.  As noted earlier, this is below the GATT standard of 
“appropriate” suspensions24 (even though, quite paradoxically, GATT did not 
have the DSU’s implied obligation of cessation) as well as below the PIL standard 
of “proportional” countermeasures. 
 
• Frustrated with the ceiling of “equivalence”, arbitrators took the first opportunity 
to go beyond it so as to make their awards somewhat more credible in light of the 
self-professed objective of “inducing compliance”.  In all three export subsidy 
cases so far – where, pursuant to the Art. 4.10 of the Subsidies Agreement, 
“appropriate countermeasures” can be taken instead of “equivalent suspensions” – 
arbitrators happily exploited the broader meaning of “appropriate” (as opposed to 
“equivalent”) and granted awards tailored not to the nullification caused, but 
to the value of the violation itself, that is, the total amount of the subsidy 
(irrespective of the impact it had on the complainant in question, i.e., had Malawi 
                                                 
24 Confirmed in US/EC Bananas arbitration, paras. 6.4-6.5.  
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requested suspension instead of the EC, they would also be given 4.033 billion).25  
A great number of WTO Members remain strongly opposed to this approach.26   
 
This was done notwithstanding the fact that a footnote to the term “appropriate 
countermeasures” states that “[t]his expression is not meant to allow 
countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies 
dealt with under these provisions are prohibited”.  Rather than construing this 
footnote as tempering the level of suspensions, arbitrators took it as proof that 
given the “prohibited nature” of export subsidies, suspensions in response to 
export subsidies ought to be of a higher level than those in “normal” WTO 
violations.27   
 
This, of course, overlooks the more general move (not limited to the Subsidies 
Agreement) from a GATT “liability rule” regime to a WTO “property rule” 
regime and the WTO’s re-introduction as legally binding international law.  
Indeed, both export subsidies and all other breaches of WTO rules (other than 
mere actionable subsidies and non-violation complaints which are backed up by a 
liability rule, not a property rule28) constitute “illegal conduct” and must hence, 
                                                 
25 The FSC arbitrators noted, indeed, (at para. 6.28) that “[t]he reasoning we have followed above could be 
construed – in a purely abstract manner – to be as inherently applicable to any other Member as to the 
complainant in this case viz. the European Communities”.  Hence, had Malawi brought the complaint, 
Malawi as well would have been authorized to suspend concessions worth 4.033 billion !   
26 In DSB meetings, for example: Philippines, Brazil, Canada, United States.  When FSC was adopted, the 
US offered a blistering critique, which did not draw any opposing response (DSB Minutes, p. 3):  “to the 
extent that the Canada – Aircraft decision was devoid of standards, it was because it was modelled on the 
FSC decision, which was itself devoid of any standard.  The FSC arbitration decision was a seriously 
flawed document …  The minutes of the Uruguay Round Negotiating Group on Subsidies revealed that this 
was the position of every delegation that had spoken on this issue.  Not a single delegation had expressed 
the view that countermeasures should be based on anything other than trade effects”. 
27 The FSC arbitrator went as far as stating that this aggravating factor must be taken into account (para. 
5.30):  “we have found not only that … there is an entitlement to take account of the unlawful nature of the 
initial act which gives rise to the countermeasures, but also that this is the perspective for assessment 
specifically required under the SCM Agreement.” 
28 Actionable subsidies must not necessarily be removed.  It suffices to “take appropriate steps to remove 
the adverse effects” (Art. 7.8 Subsidies Agreement).  The same applies to successful non-violation cases 
where there is “no obligation to withdraw the measure”, “a mutually satisfactory adjustment” suffices and 
“compensation may be part of a mutually satisfactory adjustment as final settlement of the dispute” (DSU 
Art. 26.1(b) and (d)).  In other words, actionable subsidies and non-violation claims are backed-up by a 
liability rule, not a property rule.  Moreover, while no suspensions back up non-violation claims, actionable 
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under the DSU’s implicit obligation of cessation, be withdrawn or brought into 
conformity with WTO rules.  To give but one example, is it really so that export 
subsidies under the Subsidies Agreement (where the term “appropriate 
countermeasures” is found) are more prohibited or a more serious violation than 
export subsidies inconsistent with, and hence prohibited under, the Agreement on 
Agriculture?  
   
• Notwithstanding what is now a huge discrepancy between export subsidy 
violations (at least those under the Subsidies Agreement) and all other WTO 
violations, arbitrators in all cases so far confirmed that suspensions cannot be 
“punitive”.  Quite surprisingly, they continue to say so even in export subsidy 
awards where they grant suspensions not based on the harm caused, but inflated 
on the ground of the importance of the rules violated, i.e., the fact that export 
subsidies are “prohibited”.  Depending, of course, on how one defines “punitive”, 
to the extent export subsidy awards have gone beyond damage caused to the 
complainant, punitive suspensions have, in my view, been authorized.29   
 
This was particularly so in Export Credits where Canada openly stated that it 
would not comply in respect of contracted but not yet delivered aircraft.  On that 
ground, the arbitrators decided to adjust the level upwards with 20%, i.e. “by an 
amount which we deem reasonably meaningful to cause Canada to reconsider its 
current position to maintain the subsidy at issue in breach of its obligations” (para. 
3.121).  If this is not punitive, it is hard to imagine what is.   
 
• Although (in non-Subsidy agreement cases) one might expect that arbitrators 
would broadly interpret “equivalence” in the light of the stated objective that 
suspensions must “induce compliance”, the opposite has happened.  Arbitrators 
                                                                                                                                                 
subsidies can justify “countermeasures, commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects 
determined to exist” (Art. 7.9 Subsidies Agreement). 
29 The 1916 Act arbitrators would agree.  In their view, “any suspension of obligations in excess of the level 
of nullification or impairment would be punitive” (para. 5.22). 
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have been very hesitant not to over-estimate nullification and refused to 
factor in harm that was not direct, absolutely clear and fully proven.   
 
In US/Bananas arbitrators refused to count US fertilizer and machinery exports to 
Latin America as well as US capital, management and packaging services offered 
in respect of Latin American banana exports (arguing that it was for those Latin 
American countries to claim these harms).  
 
In Hormones, the arbitrators noted:  “we need to guard against claims of lost 
opportunities where the causal link with the inconsistent hormone ban is less than 
apparent” (para. 41) and rejected harm with “too remote” or “too speculative” a 
causal link (para. 77).   
 
In 1916 Act the arbitrators insisted on “credible, factual, and verifiable 
information” (para. 5.54) and stressed that “this prudent approach … is 
appropriate” (para. 5.57).  As a result, they rejected to count any settlement under 
the 1916 Act that was not disclosed (para. 5.63).  Since under US law most (if not 
all) settlements are bound by confidentiality rules, no settlements are currently 
covered.  The same arbitrators refused to count the “chilling effect” of merely 
having legislation in place (even if it is not actually applied) for being “too 
speculative, and too remote” (para. 5.69), noting dryly that “a quantification of the 
chilling effect is not possible (para. 5.72).  While accepting final damages 
amounts and fines in judgments under the 1916 Act, they refused to count 
litigation costs (para. 5.76).     
 
Under this line of case law, the question must be asked why the benefit of the 
doubt is given to the wrongdoer?  Given that it is the wrongdoer who breached 
WTO rules in the first place and the stated objective of suspensions is “inducing 
compliance”, ought the benefit of the doubt not be given to the victim? After 
all, arbitrators have confirmed that it is for the wrongdoer to prove why the level 
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proposed by the victim is not equivalent to nullification (the burden of proof does 
not rest on the victim). 
    
• In the 1916 Act and especially the Byrd arbitration, a question mark has finally 
been raised as to the objective of “inducing compliance”.  Already in FSC the 
United States referred to “the objective of maintaining a proper balance between 
the rights and obligations of Members, as foreseen in Article 3.3 of the DSU” 
(para. 5.29).  In response to a similar US argument, the 1916 arbitrators found: 
 
“in our view, a key objective of the suspension of concessions or 
obligations whatever other purposes may exist – is to seek to induce 
compliance by the other WTO Member with ts WTO obligations” (para. 
5.5). 
 
 In Byrd, however, the arbitrators went a step further (para. 6.2 and 3.74): 
 
“the DSU does not expressly explain the purpose behind the authorization 
of the suspension … we are not persuaded that … the purpose of 
suspension … would be exclusively to induce compliance … we cannot 
exclude that inducing compliance is part of the objectives behind 
suspension … but at most it can be only one of a number of purposes in 
authorizing the suspension … By relying on "inducing compliance" as the 
benchmark … we also run the risk of losing sight of the requirement of 
Article 22.4 that the level of suspension be equivalent”. 
 
The Byrd arbitrators referred to the compensatory function of suspension, noting 
(at para. 6.3) that the requirement of equivalence  
 
“seems to imply that suspension of concessions or other obligations is 
only a means of obtaining some form of temporary compensation, even 
when the negotiation of compensations has failed.”   
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In the end the arbitrators admitted their confusion as follows (para. 6.4): 
 
“it is not completely clear what role is to be played by the suspension of 
obligations in the DSU and a large part of the conceptual debate that took 
place in these proceedings could have been avoided if a clear "object and 
purpose" were identified.” 
 
 (ii) Must suspensions offset the full value of the original violation (e.g., the total sum of 
the subsidy), compensate all economic harm caused by the breach or be limited to 
bilateral trade damage?  
 
• In most cases, “equivalence to nullification and impairment” was interpreted as 
referring only to the trade effects of the original breach.  In other words, 
US/Canadian beef exports kept out of the EC market because of the hormone-beef 
ban. The level of suspensions was then set at the total trade value of exports 
annually kept out (the same happened in Byrd and the two Bananas arbitrations, 
including the Equador/EC one where the value of a TRIPS suspension was 
measured not with reference to lost royalties but with reference to the total trade 
value of, for example, CDs that would be kept out of Ecuador due to the 
suspension of IP rights). 
 
• In the 1916 Act and Copyright arbitrations, however, (under the same 
“equivalence” standard) reference was made not to trade effects but to the more 
general formula of economic effects (in 1916, the money lost by EC firms in US 
court judgments and final settlements; in Copyright, the licensing royalties that 
EC copyright holders were foregoing under US copyright legislation).   
 
On the one hand, this benchmark can lead to higher levels of suspension (since 
harm other than direct trade harm can be factored in), on the other hand in pure 
welfare terms this could also lower the level of suspensions (since the economic 
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harm caused by having to shift export markets or domestic industries altogether is 
generally estimated at only a couple of percentages of the full value of diverted 
trade).   
 
• Using the benchmark of economic effects also raises the question of whether it is 
the economic harm to the exporting country as a whole that counts, or rather 
the economic harm to individual operators (in particular exporting firms).30   
 
In 1916, for example, the arbitrators refused to discount moneys recovered by EC 
firms under internal EC ‘blocking’ legislation pursuant to which EC firms can re-
claim any amounts they had to pay under the 1916 Act against the US firms that 
initiated the claim.  If it is truly the economic harm caused to EC firms that 
counts, such recovered sums ought, however, to be factored in.  The same 
argument could be made in respect of prison terms pronounced under the 1916 
Act (pursuant to which certain exporters dumping on the US market can be forced 
to pay treble damages, fines and even be put in prison).  Spending time in prison 
surely harms, including economically.  Should WTO arbitrators put a money 
value on this and add it for purposes of the level of suspensions?  If economic 
effects is the standard I would think so.  However, the arbitrators in 1916 failed to 
even mention this element.  Crucially, if all economic effects must be calculated 
they should include litigation costs and “chilling effects” related to the mere 
enactment of a measure, i.e., the effect it has on exporters changing their behavior 
and thereby losing money to avoid application of the law; even the mere risk of 
seeing the law applied has an economic effect.  The arbitrators rejected all of 
these costs.  
 
• Finally, using economic harm rather than trade harm raises the question of 
whether only harm caused after the reasonable period of time for 
implementing a WTO ruling can be covered, or also harm caused before that.  
                                                 
30 In US/Bananas, para. 7.1, the arbitrators explicitly rejected the idea of using as a reference “US firms’ 
costs and profits, as used in the US submission”.  What counted was US exports. 
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In 1916, reference was made to “any” judgments and final settlement awards.  
Does this mean that also those before the end of the reasonable period of time 
count?  If so, this would be quite different from the standard trade effects test 
where the calculation is based on the question of what trade would have been 
added if the wrongdoer had brought his regime in line with WTO rules (e.g., lifted 
the hormone-beef ban) the day of the lapse of the reasonable period of time? 
 
(iii) How have developing countries been able to use the instrument of suspension? 
 
The “suspension” experience so far of developing country complainants is not very 
promising.  Although there is no evidence that developing countries have been less able 
to induce compliance with WTO rules and rulings (though more because of reputational 
costs for the rich countries than based on the threat of retaliation by the poor), when they 
did resort to countermeasures the limits of the instrument for weaker players became 
readily apparent.   
 
• Although six developing countries obtained authorization to suspend concessions 
(Ecuador in Bananas; Brazil in Export Credits; and Brazil, Chile, India and 
Mexico in Byrd), so far none of these have actually been exercised.   
 
• In Bananas, the arbitrators openly acknowledged the difficulty of a small, 
developing country inducing compliance through suspension against a big trading 
nation like the EC (para. 73): 
 
“One may ask whether this objective [of inducing compliance] may ever 
be achieved in a situation where a great imbalance in terms of trade 
volume and economic power exists between the complaining party 
seeking suspension and the other party which has failed to bring WTO-
inconsistent measures into compliance with WTO law. In such a case, and 
in situations where the complaining party is highly dependent on imports 
from the other party, it may happen that the suspension … entails more 
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harmful effects for the party seeking suspension than for the other 
party”.31
 
Developing countries are, indeed, twice disadvantaged under the WTO’s 
retaliation mechanism.  Firstly, the harm they suffer from a violation, even if 
small in absolute terms, can be huge for them in relative terms.  Yet, the 
suspension authorized in return only offsets the harm in absolute terms and if it 
does so against a big trading nation this absolute figure will have a much smaller 
impact, in relative terms, on the wrongdoing big nation than the original breach 
has on the small victim.  In relative terms, suspension is therefore never 
equivalent to harm.  Secondly, suspension itself is unlikely to bring any benefit to 
developing countries nor to harm big country wrongdoers.  Since most developing 
countries are not “large countries”, protection is unlikely to improve their terms of 
trade.  Moreover, when US steel producers are kept out of the Malawi market in 
retaliation, US steel producers will make little noice with the US government.  
Hence, unlike retaliation by the EC, the US government will feel far less pressure 
to comply when retaliation comes from a small player than when it comes from a 
big trading partner.  These factors plead in favor of spreading the cost of 
countermeasures away from developing country complainants, that is, to make 
countermeasures more collective for developing country complaints (in the UN 
Security Council, for example, trade sanctions are an obligation on all UN 
members).  
 
• Factors other than the absolute amount of the trade impact have been referred 
to in Ecuador’s request for cross-retaliation in Bananas.  Cross-retaliation was 
granted in that case (at least partly, under GATS and TRIPS) taking into account  
 
                                                 
31 For an idea of the asymmetry (para. 125):  “Ecuador's population is 12 million, while the EC's population 
is 375 million. Ecuador's share of world merchandise trade is below 0.1 per cent, whereas the EC's world 
merchandise trade share is in the area of 20 per cent. In terms of world trade in services, the EC's share is 
25 per cent, while no data are available for Ecuador because its share would be so small.  The GDP at 
market prices in 1998 was US$20 billion for Ecuador and US$7,996 billion for the 15 EC member States. 
In 1998, the EC's GDP per capita is US$22,500, whereas per capita income is US$1,600 in the case of 
Ecuador”. 
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(i) “the importance of [bananas] trade to” Ecuador32; and 
(ii) “the broader economic elements related to the nullification” and “the 
broader economic consequences of the suspension”.33
 
Crucially, however, this relative trade factor (how important are bananas for 
Ecuador) and broader economic factors have only played out only in deciding 
whether cross-retaliation is permitted, not in setting the level of suspensions.  
Nonetheless, in cases where developing countries are forced to take 
countermeasures, a strong argument can be made that such factors should count 
also in setting the level itself.  DSU Art. 22.7 provides:   
 
“If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, in 
considering what appropriate action might be taken, the DSB shall take 
into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained of, but 
also their impact on the economy of developing country Members 
concerned”.34
 
•  In Export Credits the relatively small size of the Brazilian market actually 
worked against it.  It was used as an argument to lower Brazil’s rights to 
suspension.  The arbitrators looked at the overall level of trade between Canada 
and Brazil (Canada’s export to Brazil are, according to Canada, US$591 m, 
according to Brazil, US$927 m) and found as follows (para. 3.42): 
 
                                                 
32 DSU Art. 22.3(d)(i).  Equador/EC Bananas Arbitration, para. 129:  “Nearly 11 per cent of Ecuador's 
population is totally dependent on this sector. Banana exports (in goods only) represent 25.45 per cent of 
Ecuador's total merchandise exports. Banana production represents nearly 5.2 per cent of the GDP. In 
Ecuador's view, the banana industry is of greater importance to its economy than the whole agricultural 
sector in most developed countries”. 
33 DSU Art. 22.3(d)(ii).  Ecuador referred in this respect to the fact that it was experiencing “the worst 
economic crisis in Ecuador’s history” (para. 132). 
34 This provision follows DSU Art. 22.7:  “If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing 
country Member, the DSB shall consider what further action it might take which could be appropriate to 
the circumstances”.  DSU Art. 21.2 adds:  “Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the 
interests of developing country Members with respect to measures which have been subject to WTO 
dispute settlement”.  
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“This disparity between the level of the proposed countermeasures and the 
total value of Brazil's imports of goods from Canada is so large that, in our 
view, it is not fitting by way of response to the case at hand.” 
 
Hence, instead of feeling pity for Brazil (and its low levels of imports from 
Canada), the arbitrators used this factor against Brazil.  This is like saying that 
since the victim of a crime is poor or does not have the strength to retaliate, we 
must reduce the penalty on the wrongdoer. 
 
 
In summary, WTO case law on suspension of concessions is in disarray.  There is great 
confusion as to what the objective(s) are of suspension and even in those cases where it 
was taken to be “inducement of compliance”, varying benchmarks have been adopted 
(export subsidy cases vs. other cases; trade effect vs. economic effect, etc.).  Moreover, 
whilst in the early cases a clear normative stance of “inducing compliance” was taken 
(reaching a “punitive peak” in the Canada – Exports Credit case), the latest tendency 
demonstrates the realization that suspension may not induce compliance and has other 
objectives as well.  The early “inducing compliance” tendency reflects a 
normative/European view of international law that sees a need for WTO rules to be 
complied with in all cases, at all times.  The more recent tendency is probably a swing 
back to a more American/transactional approach to international law.  If correct, this 
evolution portrays the WTO as a fledgling institution that needed to establish itself, assert 
its authority and confirm its rules as serious and legally binding.  Doing so it started off 
with permitting little flexibility.  However, once the legitimacy of the system established, 
and the system taken seriously, it can now permit itself some wiggling room.  This 
approach sees the WTO evolving from a strict, legalized system accepting only full 
compliance with its rules (at least officially and on the books), to a more flexible system 
where alternative settlements are tolerated as long as certain conditions are met.  This 
trend stands in contrast to the traditional view of the GATT/WTO, that is, one that sees a 
uni-directional move toward ever more legalization, with increasingly less room for 
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flexibility and where the GATT’s exceptions, escape clauses and re-negotiation potential 
are seen as birth defects that need to be eradicated as soon as possible. 
 
At the same time, WTO case law on suspensions highlights the limits of the 
American/transactional approach, in particular its realist and law & economics 
incarnations.  Suspension is a tool at the hands mainly of big trading nations.  Although it 
can be effective as an instrument to induce compliance, it does not operate in a neutral 
way.  Both the realist and law & economics school can explain why big trading nations 
use the instrument and why it may work for them, they fail, however, to take account of, 
let alone contain, the imbalances between WTO members.  In addition, both schools 
largely consider WTO members as unitary actors and fail to pierce the state veil so as to 
protect individual economic operators.  Although in realist terms a WTO member may be 
content with offsetting compensation or suspensions, its economic operators harmed by 
the original breach remain uncompensated (both the lower tariffs abroad, i.e., 
compensation, and the higher tariffs at home, i.e. retaliation, are in another sector than the 
original breach).  Moreover, even if in purely political terms, compensation or reciprocal 
suspensions may be “efficient” in that the wrongdoing state or politician is still better of 
breaching than complying, the individual companies harmed by either the original breach 
or the countermeasure remain in the cold.   
 
 
IV. IN CONCLUSION:  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
1. The “European” extreme:  Why not demand compliance with WTO 
rules in all cases? 
 
This normative/European approach driven to the extreme must be tempered.  WTO rules 
are not like human rights or criminal law rules.  They permit flexibility (safeguards, re-
negotiations, bilateral settlements, temporary compensation or suspension, etc.) and do so 
for good reasons:  (i) otherwise trade agreements would not have been concluded in the 
first place; (ii) the flexibility offered is a welcome democratic safety-valve ex post.   
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The drive for ever more legalization has its limits:  (i) legalization alone does not 
guarantee compliance (in the end, what matters is the political and broader societal will to 
comply); (ii) ever more legalization or closure of “Exit” from WTO rules in the WTO’s 
legal/normative regime calls for ever more “Voice” or participation in the WTO’s 
political regime.   Hence, the current balance between low Exit (a strong DSU) and high 
Voice (consensus decision-making) is a natural equilibrium (not, as most claim, an 
unhealthy imbalance).  At the same time, to further reduce Exit (e.g. by strengthening the 
obligation of cessation or imposing punitive suspensions) risks destroying the current 
equilibrium:  it will lead to even more demands for Voice or participation and too high a 
demand for Voice, if not met, puts pressure on the Exit option so that eventually too 
normative a regime may lead to the collapse of the system altogether (e.g., members 
openly disregarding the rules, even leaving the organization).  
 
The risks related to suspensions that are too high are real:  (i) the system may be over-
deterrent (in law and economics terms:  deter even breaches that are efficient)35; too high 
a suspension level may make a bilateral settlement impossible; it may be impossible for 
the wrongdoer to “buy off” the retaliation; overall breach plus retaliation may then do 
more harm than good; (ii) if suspensions are too high, victims may be unable/unwilling to 
implement them, as is already the case today (only 4 of the 16 authorizations have so far 
been utilized):  if so, the threat of retaliation looses credibility and the instrument of 
suspension loses its incentive toward compliance; in that case, the right to retaliate also 
looses its value and may prevent meaningful settlements:  if the threat of retaliation is not 
real, who would want to pay for it?  Incidentally, this is a good reason for WTO members 
to apply retaliation, once authorized, as much as they can.  Under US Section 301, 
retaliation must be imposed.  In most other countries, including the EU, this remains an 
option.  An obligation to retaliate makes the instrument more forceful and credible.     
 
                                                 
35 An obvious example of over-deterrence is anti-dumping.  Unlike the DSU or any other trade remedies, 
the countermeasure permitted against dumping is not linked to the injury caused.  Rather, it can go up to the 
full amount of the dumping margin.  This is all the more paradoxical since dumping is not even prohibited 
under WTO law ! 
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Note, finally, that the current 1:1, equivalence benchmark for WTO suspension can be 
more forceful than it looks at first sight.  The level of suspension must not be equivalent 
to the benefit derived by the wrongdoer from breach, but rather equivalent to the harm 
caused to the victim.  Since harm to victim often exceeds benefit to wrongdoer (say, the 
EC suffers more from the FSC export subsidy than the US gains from it), and a trade 
breach always incurs some harm also to the wrongdoer himself, breach may be more 
costly than compliance.  In other words, the cost of FSCs to the US – both that of tax 
revenues foregone by the US and a 4 billion loss in exports to the EC – is likely to exceed 
the benefits (economic and, especially political) that the US derives from FSCs.  In this 
sense, even with less than 100% probability of detection and the possibility of other 
enforcement errors, a 1:1 lex talionis type countermeasure can approximate optimal 
deterrence. 
 
2. The “American” extreme:  Why not permit, even stimulate, efficient 
breaches? 
 
This transactional/American approach driven to the extreme must equally be tempered.  
In domestic contract law, with unitary actors and a centralized court system to evaluate 
and award damages, the idea of stimulating efficient breach makes sense:  overall the 
society is better off if the wrongdoer gains and the victim is fully compensated (i.e., the 
cost of breach to the wrongdoer is lower than that of compliance, hence, we should 
permit breach for as long as the victim is fully compensated). 
 
However, the theory as applied by Sykes and others to the WTO system is not one of 
economically efficient breach.  Even they will not argue that the world is better off when 
a country breaches WTO rules but is willing to suffer suspensions (clearly, in economic 
terms, both the breach and the suspension are trade restrictions and, based on standard 
trade economics, both reduce overall welfare; two wrongs do not make one good, hence, 
the world is worse off).  Rather, in the WTO debate the notion of “efficient breach” is 
used in purely political terms:  the wrongdoer considers that politically he is still better 
off breaching and suffering retaliation, than complying with the rules and suffering 
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domestic opposition.  The theory only explains why the rules on safeguards and 
suspensions are there.  Unlike efficient breach in private contract law, the theory as 
applied to the WTO does not normatively prescribe the current system as ideal.     
 
Hence, although the theory of “efficient breach” can explain certain WTO rules from a 
political, public choice point of view, in normative terms, the “liability rule” system of 
unilaterally permitting breach for as long as one compensates the victim, raises serious 
problems at the WTO level (as noted earlier, the principle is absent in PIL; was present in 
GATT but is now implicitly removed at least from the DSU): 
 
• for the breach to be efficient, all victims (possibly 150 countries) ought to be fully 
compensated.  Quite clearly this is currently not the case: (i) WTO remedies only 
work prospectively, past harm remains completely uncompensated; (ii) even 
prospective harm is not compensated:  compensation currently needs the 
agreement of both parties; if it does not materialize, countermeasures can be 
taken; however, in economic terms, closing off one’s markets does not 
compensate the victim (rather it causes losses to the victim’s own importers and 
consumers; although large country victims can obtain some terms of trade 
benefits from higher protection); (iii) even if in political terms suspensions 
rebalance the scales of trade concessions to an equilibrium, it restores the 
situation ex ante, i.e. the situation that existed before concessions were 
exchanged; unlike “expectation damages” in US domestic efficient breach theory, 
it does not put the victim in the situation he would have been in had the WTO rule 
been complied with. 
 
• Even if somehow WTO remedies would provide for full compensation to all 
victims, the transaction costs required to achieve this (negotiations, collection of 
information, arbitration on levels of nullification, etc.) would be extremely high in 
a situation with potentially 150 victims.  Moreover, meaningful compensation (at 
least in trade terms) to specific victims is made difficult because of the MFN 
principle:  if a wrongdoer opens his market some more on another good in 
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compensation, such market opening cannot be limited to specific victims, through 
MFN it must be awarded to all WTO members (even non-victims).         
 
• Even if the wrongdoer is willing to pay all of these transaction costs, and still 
considers that breach is worth it, the WTO case law above shows that due to 
asymmetries of information between the parties and between the arbitrators and 
the parties, estimating the damage caused by WTO breach to victims is very 
difficult.  The estimates so far are also very unpredictable which makes it difficult 
for wrongdoers to calculate whether breach will, indeed, be less or more costly 
than compliance.  There is, moreover, a clear tendency to under-estimate the 
damage.  If so, compensation will be too low and there is a serious risk that 
breach no longer is efficient.  
 
• Given that at the WTO wrongdoers are states, actually obtaining compensation 
(even if agreed to) is less assured than under domestic law where a system of 
centralized coercion exists (sheriffs, bailiffs, etc.). 
 
• Crucially, all considerations so far regard wrongdoer and victim as unitary actors.  
As noted earlier, the private economic actors suffering from breach are not 
compensated by reciprocal suspensions in another sector nor by trade 
compensation on some other goods.  In addition, while overall the two countries 
may restore a political balance through trade compensation or suspension, such 
rebalancing not only fails to compensate the private victims of the original breach, 
it also harms new, innocent private actors (i.e., in the wrongdoing country, the 
industry for which tariffs are lowered in compensation or the importers or 
consumers of goods suffering retaliation).   
 
• The fact that WTO members are not unitary actors also changes their incentive 
structure to comply when faced with an obligation to compensate.  Whilst 
countermeasures directly hurt one or the other industry – which in turn will put 
pressure on the government to comply – an obligation to pay monetary 
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compensation widely diffuses the cost of breach to the wrongdoer (the money 
comes out of the general budget and is recovered essentially from the entire 
population).  This makes monetary compensation at the WTO a weaker 
instrument toward efficient breach or compliance than it is in domestic law.  
Indeed, on the state-to-state scene, compensation also plays less of a reputational 
and deterrent function than countermeasures. 
 
• Engaging in efficient breach is likely to be easier for big players than for small 
ones.  Big players will be more immune from pressure in other areas (e.g., 
development assistance, GSP lists, etc.):  this is likely to make their “efficient 
breaches” more easy and those by weak players more difficult.  Moreover, small 
players may be less able to pay their way out (they have less to offer in 
compensation).  This may for all practical purposes take away the right to 
efficient breach from weaker countries (which would amount to a serious inequity 
in the system) or leave the victims of weak country breaches uncompensated 
(which would make the breach inefficient).  The latter corresponds to the 
domestic law problem of “judgment-proof” wrongdoers.   
 
In conclusion, all the points above provide strong reasons in favor of a property rule 
rather than a liability rule in the WTO system.  In domestic law as well, when transaction 
costs are high, damage is hard to calculate, there is a tendency for under-compensation 
and damages awards risk not being paid, the problem of under-deterrence (or inefficient 
breaches) has led to the imposition of a property rule (as for the protection of ownership 
or under criminal law).  Recall, however, that this would only prevent WTO members 
from unilaterally breaching WTO rules combined with compensation; a property rule 
remains consistent with the idea that bilateral settlements or re-negotiations can end a 
trade problem, for as long as both parties agree.   
 
In that sense, it is a middle way between the European extreme of compliance-in-all-
cases, and the American extreme of permitting unilateral breach for as long as one pays 
for it. 
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The above reasons also highlight the risks of countermeasures that are too low (like 
compensation that is too low, the system may then lead to under-deterrence).  More 
generally, unlike what the managerial school seems to imply, countermeasures will 
always have a role to play in the world trade system:  (i) reciprocity is what triggered the 
system and what holds it together; (ii) countermeasures may harm the victim of the 
original breach (not always, however, especially if the country is a “large” one); at the 
same time, they also stand to hurt the wrongdoer, if not economically, then at least 
politically (target industries will pressure the wrongdoing government into compliance, 
as they did in the US when faced with EC retaliation in the Steel case); (iii) 
countermeasures are an instrument in the sole hands of the victim; unlike compensation it 
does not require any positive step from the wrongdoer; hence, retaliation will always be 
needed as a backup in case compensation fails (as is the case in recent FTAs concluded 
by the US, even those providing for an obligation to compensate). 
 
The above problems with an efficient breach approach also point in the direction of 
monetary compensation instead of trade compensation (given the non-unitary nature of 
WTO members).  Monetary compensation could trickle down to harmed private 
operators, be it offered at the WTO level or at the domestic level (as some European 
companies are now trying to do, claiming compensation before the European Court of 
Justice against the EC itself for non-implementation of WTO rulings in Hormones).  As 
noted by one author examining the evolution of liability regimes in Ancient Law: 
 
“Subsequent to its formal regulation, the practice of literal retaliation for physical 
injuries [much like the WTO’s “equivalent” suspension standard] quickly fell into 
disuse.  A system of compensation gradually replaced retaliation … The irony of 
this evolution is evident:  once consecrated into clear and rigorous rules, the 
practices of retaliation tend to be abandoned”.36
 
                                                 
36 Francesco Parisi, The Genesis of Liability Rules in Ancient Law, American Law and Economics Review 
(2001), 82-124, at 107. 
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The reason why is that with a strict obligation to impose talionic, 1:1 punishment, the 
victim was induced to accept the payment of “blood money”.  Retaliation gave the victim 
a disposable and enforceable right; this right (much like suspension in the WTO) was of 
most value to the original wrongdoer since he would suffer more from the retaliation than 
the victim would win from it (losing your eye harms you more than it benefits the one 
taking it out); thus, compensation became the price paid for the transfer of the right to 
retaliation to the highest valuing individual.   
 
The problem in the WTO context is that neither compensation, nor retaliation are an 
obligation (compensation is voluntary; retaliation is only a right, not an obligation).  In 
this context, it is harder to extract “blood money”.  As Parisi noted: 
 
“a system of voluntary compensation is deemed to collapse in the absence of a 
credible threat of retaliation”.37
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 117. 
